What is the range of Americas policy options given its own interests in the region in terms of both economic and security strategy and where can it improve on current policy choices? Passed in August 2018, the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) prohibited the Pentagon from financing Chinese language programs at universities that host a CI, absent Department of Defense waivers, which have not been granted. However, the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF), a nominally independent organization registered with the Civil Affairs Ministry, supervised by MOE, and initiated by 27 Chinese universities, companies and social organizations, will manage the CI brand and program. Regardless of the skepticism that it could do so, China has demonstrated its capacity to innovate and compete technologically on a global scale. Brookings's reports do not disclose specific contribution amounts but instead categorize donors into ranges. Online. The PowerPoint presentation is online. How important is Europe for Americas China policy? To meet this challenge, the U.S. government should increase funding for Mandarin language and China studies courses, but also stop forcing cash-strapped universities to choose between federal funding and properly managed CI programs. Its analysis of governance and secrecy provisions in 90 CI agreements found that U.S. university personnel generally control curriculum and teaching materials, although this is not always made clear in agreements. In an era of tight funding for and decline of interest in Chinese language and culture programs, and a clear need for cultivating Mandarin speakers and China expertise across multiple disciplines, the modest financial contribution and native Mandarin language professionals provided through an appropriately managed Confucius Institute network should be welcomed, not castigated. In its response to the department, CIUS explained that, although it seeks to foster awareness of CI programs, it does not fund, supply, staff, supervise or serve as a headquarters for CIs in the U.S. As a registered nonprofit corporation, its financials and related organizational details are publicly available through annual IRS Form 990s. The United States cannot (and does not want to) compete dollar for dollar in countries where the Belt and Road Initiative is making large investments in infrastructure. In particular, how do politics, economics, security dynamics, as well as regional and geo-political considerations intersect in defining Chinas relationship with the region and its strategy toward it? That includes both techniques for pushing back against growing Chinese influence, but also possibly strategies for advancing the use of global order frameworks as devices for helping to manage the bilateral relationship. At that Huawei-sponsored event, West took Huaweis side. On April 27, The Hamilton Project and the Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability will convene leaders and experts to examine the future of clean energy innovation and deployment. That formidable task requires the U.S. to foster more realistic and actionable expectations, criticisms and commitments, rather than policies and actions based on an alarmist China caricature that does not reflect the more complex reality of that country, its people and its behavior abroad. Aside from financial instability arising in the two big economies, there are various external shocks that buffet countries or regions. Distortive trade practices from either one subsidies that distort trade, dumping, or protectionism via tariffs or non-tariff barriers reduce development opportunities. U.S.-China relationship is undergoing a transition toward intensifying rivalry even as it remains highly interdependent across a range of domains. What steps can it take in coordination with allies to increase the probability of maintaining Chinas dependence on imports of AI chips? China, East Asia ysun@stimson.org (202) 478-3434 Yun Sun is a Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. In turn, Brookings Institute staff like Richard C. Bush (a former member of the National Intelligence Council and a U.S. national intelligence officer for East Asia) vociferously champion the . Chinese universities that participate in CIEF and serve as CI partners are mostly state-funded and, like everything in China, under CCP leadership. In the past, many analysts have been skeptical of the potential for deep cooperation between two countries that have had difficult relations historically. Beijing will want to visibly register its displeasure, lest its leaders be accused at home of tolerating Taiwan's efforts to move further away from China. West joined Brookings in 2008. As tensions between the U.S. and China grew, federal policymakers frequently conflated CI-related academic freedom concerns with a broader set of issues including: Chinese efforts to steal technology, intellectual property and research data; disruptive activities by some campus-based Chinese student associations and Chinas consulates; Chinese talent recruitment plans; and other suspect influence efforts. How can democratic governments engage strategically in AI standards setting processes without turning them into a locus of geopolitical competition? Other military contingencies involving China, for example those in the so-called gray zone, are worrisome too, ranging from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. Our records indicate this scholar adhered to these policies regarding reimbursement and disclosure.) West attended Huaweis fourth annual European Innovation Day in Paris in 2016, where he shared his thoughts on how wireless technology is reshaping our lives, according to a Huawei press release. Assets and funding. How can the United States deepen its bench of AI talent, from top-tier researchers that push forward the state-of-the-art in both AI algorithms and hardware to engineers and developers that can deploy AI at scale? The consequences of U.S.-China competition over AI and emerging technology extend far beyond the digital domain. What are the set of core U.S. national interests that should result in strategic and well-resourced Indo-Pacific initiatives? The Brookings Doha Center, an arm of the think tank in Qatar's capital that focuses on Middle East issues, is funded largely by the Qatari government, which has pledged $21.6 million to . On the other hand, Chinas relationship with Russia provides an opportunity for both of those countries to work together to counter and undermine the long-standing U.S.-led international order. But so has a decline of American student interest in China studies and learning Mandarin Chinese. Chinas smart cities market is estimated to be worth more than $1 trillion, and three Chinese entities dominate smart city patents. What are the key dynamics and salient issues at play in Chinas relationship with the region? This article was published more than4 years ago. These entities include Huawei, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the State Grid Corporation, which holds the number one spot. [2] This project is a 135MW gas to power plant by Sinohydro (a brand of Power Construction Corporation of China) and Supreme Trading. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command believes it plausible that China could attempt a forced reunification with Taiwan by the latter years of the 2020s; whatever Beijings actual plans, Taiwan politics interject an additional element into the strategic equation, beyond the ability of either Washington or Beijing to control. It wasnt long ago that many U.S. government officials and China experts still clung to the idea that Chinese innovation was mostly based on copying U.S. methods and technology. At least three U.S. universities with CIs have hosted the Dalai Lama, although a CI director warned another universitys provost that re-scheduling a cancelled visit by the Dalai Lama could disrupt relationships with China, leading the provost to observe that a CI does present opportunities for subtle pressure and conflict. Most CIs do limit their scope to language and traditional culture, leaving political and other topics to other university contexts. In an era of tight funding for and decline of interest in Chinese language and culture programs, and a clear need for cultivating Mandarin speakers and China expertise across multiple disciplines, the modest financial contribution and native Mandarin language professionals provided through an appropriately managed CI network should be welcomed, not castigated. Our group seeks to explore the following questions: Our broader work will include research on the strategic and military significance of Chinese incorporation of Taiwan into its territory as well as work on integrated deterrence and on forecasting war outcomes over Taiwan. Fortunately, there are steps that the United States, working in partnership with other democratic governments, can take to safeguard democracy and liberal values in an age of AI. What steps can be taken to prevent escalation to general war or nuclear war if a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan begins? Our mission is to conduct in-depth research that leads to new ideas for solving problems facing society . On Dec. 5, the news broke that Canada had arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou for extradition to the United States for allegedly violating Iran sanctions. Although Japanese and South Korean firms also sit within the top ten holders of smart city patents, State Grid Corporations 7,156 patents in November 2020 was more than double second-ranked Samsungs mere 3,148 patents. In this context, it is essential to mitigate the risks of U.S.-China war over Taiwan in particular. From a potential responsible stakeholder to a strategic competitor, the U.S. governments assessment of China has changed dramatically in recent years. What are the differences within Europe regarding relations with China, and can the United States and Europe develop common approaches to respond to Beijings economic, political, and military challenges? "We have to wake this country up to what China is doing," Sen. Mark Warner, Va.-D, said at the Brookings Institution last month. I think the way that Huawei has been singled out by the U.S. government has been unfair and counterproductive, West said. As we watch the Chinese Communist Party celebrate its centennial anniversary in 2021, many observers have noted that China has moved away from traditional communism and more towards a system that fits its modern needsSocialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, as designated by Xi Jinping himself. What role can China play in restructuring debts and ensuring their sustainability? By then, the U.S. government had mostly blocked Huawei from the U.S. market, and in a damning October 2012 report, the U.S. House Intelligence Committee called the company a national security threat amidst allegations it had stolen sensitive information from American companies. Ensuring a good environment for development is in the interest of both super-powers because a world of poverty and slow growth is likely to be full of conflict. What does a global China mean for the US and the world? What is the proper balance between working to create external incentives and disincentives that move China in Americas preferred directions, and dealing directly with China to influence how they define and pursue their interests? Since his early days as leader, Xi Jinping has emphasized the need to unswervingly follow the path of independent innovation with Chinese characteristics. This push is beginning to deliver results. How have China and Russia developed their deep partnership, and what are the main areas in which the two countries cooperate? Hopes were high when President Xi Jinping appointed Xie Zhenhua as Chinas special envoy for climate change. The Brookings Institution, a prominent Washington, D.C., think tank, partnered with a Shanghai policy center that the FBI has described as a front for China's intelligence and spy recruitment operations, according to public records and federal court documents. What are the policy implications for the United States overall economic competitiveness and its national security? Despite a bipartisan congressional finding announced in February 2019 of no evidence that these institutes are a center for Chinese espionage efforts or any other illegal activity, the 2021 NDAA broadens the restriction to funding for any program at universities that host CIs. But China is not just a growing military power; its also increasingly intent on wielding a combination of diplomatic and economic tools to challenge or reshape the terms and conditions of global order and global governance. Moreover, as a recent study commissioned by Chinas MOE observed, in a charged U.S. political atmosphere, the Confucius Institute brand is now associated with Chinese political interference. As of 2017, the Brookings Institution had . Chinas investments in Europe, especially in technology, have concerned the United States in its role as the leading power in NATO, whose interoperability might be compromised by Chinas efforts in this area. For the United States, it is about protecting a crucial democratic friend, and perhaps also reducing the odds that China could gain a strategic asset. The Brookings Institution, one of the country's top left-leaning think tanks, has for the first time admitted to Congress that it receives millions of dollars every year from foreign. In short, China has demonstrated its capacity to indigenously innovate, but this capacity has not yet proliferated across all key sectors. From human rights to energy to trade and beyond, how is China approaching global norms and norm development?
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brookings institute funded by china